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INTRODUCTION

As any moviegoer will tell you, the essence of the tension in a police
movie is typically that the police and the person(s) being chased or
sought do not share the same values or beliefs as to truth, justice and the
application of either. Even within police themed movies, however, there
is a dichotomy between the relationship and implications of the police
and policed in a situation where both groups share the same nationality
and socio-legal referents and where the police are an outside force that
shares no common national and socio-legal referents to create an
understanding. These differences in philosophy are important to this
article because they serve as microcosms for legal systems and police
systems in general and particularly in situations where domestic conflict
has caused outside actors to enter the policing arena.
The cinematic comparisons made above are meant to serve as a basic
framework for the topic of this article: the effect of United Nations
policing efforts on the concept of state sovereignty. Police movies are
used to illustrate the idea that there is necessarily a lacuna of
commonality and understanding between those who occupy part or all of
a nation and carry out a police function-for whatever reason-and
those who are in the occupied area and find themselves policed. This
lacuna exists in civilian police settings, the author argues, because there
is a different sense of function and place between civilian police and
military forces. It is the author's contention that both parties to the
policing arrangement-be they individuals, states, or organizationsgive up portions of their sovereignty in the creation and maintenance of
the police and policed relationship where the police are not serving the
state which theoretically guards the policed.
Part II of this article provides a discussion of legal concepts of state
sovereignty in international law. Part III examines the role of police in
U.N. peacekeeping missions from the first peacekeeping mission entailing
policing operations in the 1960s through present day operations. This
examination reveals a pattern in the growth and development of policing
1. Consider, for example. the role and relationships of the police in The Fugitive
and Casablanca.
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activities in peacekeeping missions across the world. Some scholars
believe this growth towards a robust policing element in U.N. peacekeeping
is a new phenomenon which typifies the post-Cold War world's
instabilities and the increased inability of the United Nations Security
Council's (UNSC) to reach a consensus on conflict-related issues. 2 The
author posits that robust policing was both authorized and tacitly used
well before the end of the Cold War. It is the author's view that,
although the end of the Cold War might have allowed greater latitude in
some peacekeeping operations, the current trend of robust policing
activities is inherently attached to the concept of U.N. peacekeeping per
se. This observation brings with it serious consequences for issues of
respect of state sovereignty and the ability of a state to lose its sovereignty
to the international system through U.N. police forces in U.N. peacekeeping
3
missions.
Part IV of this article addresses issues involving U.N. policing. From
a lack of training for the specific mission requirements to fundamental
differences in accepted police conduct within the sending state to
fundamental differences in expectations of police and U.N. missions
generally, there are a staggering number of basic and truly important
issues which are unaddressed by the U.N. prior to and during police
deployment. There are also incredibly few instances of fundamental
appreciation for and inclusion of the experiences, expectations, and
goals of the people policed by U.N. police in the mission plans and
structure used by U.N. police; indeed, the U.N. police are often unable to
protect themselves and their fellow mission members from the same
conduct which they were deployed to stop.
The issues highlighted in Part IV and the background provided in
Parts II and III link together in Part V. Here, the author examines the
role of U.N. policing on the sovereignty of: (1) the state to which U.N.
police are deployed ("recipient state"), and (2) the sending state of the
2. See Nina M. Serafino, Cong. Research Serv., Policing in Peacekeeping and
Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions 6 (Mar. 30. 2004),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL32321.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2008); ULF
1-AUSSLER, ENSURING AND ENFORCING HUMAN SECURITY: THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE MISSIONS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, MILITARY OPERATIONS, POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS §

1.2 (2007).
3. The issue of using an international police force on peacekeeping and other

missions mounted by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the
European Union (EU)-is outside the intended scope of the article due to the author's
belief that these organizations do not threaten sovereignty to the same extent as the
U.N.'s policing actions do because of their regional quality.

1 82009 426 O6PM
1/S/2009 4:26-06 PM

HARRINGTON
HARRINGTON

U.N. police itself. The author concludes that the sovereignty of both the
recipient state and the sending state is undermined by the current U.N.
policing model in varying ways. It is the author's belief that to further
the asserted goals of the U.N. and maintain the system of state sovereignty
on which international law is premised, U.N. policing should be done
away with in favor of policing activities such as those used by the
American government. In this system, police are trained in modern
policing tactics and human rights legal concepts and then serve as the
police force for the community independent of an international organization
for guidance or approval.
Part VI concludes the article with the idea that, as in international
cinema, policing by persons with shared understandings of the system
and its legal, moral, and procedural framework is superior
to policing by
4
an outside entity in terms of sovereignty protections.
II. SOVEREIGNTY CONCEPTS

Sovereignty is often easier to conceptualize than to define. Initial
concepts of sovereignty focused on a monarch who reigned over a
particular domain and was owed a duty by the local population for his
protection. 5 In such an arrangement, the sovereign was free to engage in
conquest as he saw fit to enhance the primacy of his sovereignty through
territory. 6
Since the end of World War ii, sovereignty has become linked to state
recognition, which in turn has become linked to dual concepts of
statehood qualification and political approval. To be recognized as a
sovereign state, a state must actually be deemed to exist.7 The standard
test applied by the international community for statehood existence is:
(1) a population, (2) a territory, (3) effective control of the territory and
people claimed to be a part of the state, and (4) the ability to enter into
agreements with members of the international community. 8 Even if a
4. This must be tempered by the caveat that the author's recommendations are
tailored to states which have not completely lost their governmental structure. For
example, the author believes strongly in the need for outside police, especially military
police, in situations like Iraq, where the government is gone, a new government has yet
to be established, and there is a directly accountable state providing the police structure
while training local inhabitants to be their own police force.
5.

Yoram Dinstein, Sovereignty, the Security Council and the Use of Force, in

REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR

(Michael Bothe,

Mary Ellen O'Connell & Natalino Ronzitti eds. 2005)
6.
7.

See id.
See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 368 (5th ed. 2003).

8. Id. at 178. For the purposes of later discussions in the article, the important
element to consider in the policing context is effective control of the territory and
population.
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state can demonstrate that it meets these criteria, commonly referred to
as the "Montevideo factors," it is not guaranteed to be classified as a
sovereign state within the world community. 9 Rather, the state must
increasingly meet the political requirements of the international community
at that time.' 0
Sovereignty as an absolute protection for those ruling a state has come
under attack in recent years, and incidents in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Darfur have exacerbated the questions surrounding this
formerly well-established principle.'' Although it is generally accepted
that the international community prefers not to allow previously existing
states to cease existing in the international system,' 2 there is no tenet in
current international law which prohibits the weakening of a state's
internal sovereignty through actions such as U.N. peacekeeping and
policing. At the same time, Ban Ki-Moon, the current Secretary General
of the United Nations, has said that the legal and political concept of13
state sovereignty must come second to multi-nationalism in the future.
The views of Mr. Ban aside, international law, both treaty and customary,
and the municipal law of states in the international system still recognizes
state sovereignty as a bedrock principle and it will be treated as such for
the purposes of this article.
IIi. POLICING IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
A. What is U.N. Policing?
U.N. police deployments are similar to peacekeeping deployments in
that they are staffed by national contingents belonging to U.N. member

9. Id.
10.

See id. at 368 76 (discussing the many other criteria which the international

community and its member have and currently use to determine whether to recognize a
state and thus legitimate its sovereignty).
11. The key issue presented in each of these instances is the appropriate balance
between respecting the territorial and political sovereignty of a state and protecting the
interests of the native populations in the face of extant and threatened human rights
abuses.
12.

SHAW, supra note 7, at 186-89.

13. U.N. Secretary-General, Message on United Nations Day 2007 ("The world is
changing in the United Nations' favour-as more people and Governments understand
that multilateralism is the only path in our interdependent and globalizing world. Global
problems demand global solutions-and going it alone is not a viable option. Whether
we are speaking of peace and security, development, or human rights, demands on our
Organization are growing every day.").
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states. 14 With limited exceptions, there are typically fewer U.N. police
15
officers assigned to a peacekeeping mission than there are peacekeepers.
U.N. police are drawn from different sources depending on the policing
structure used by the sending state. In states such as the United States,
where there is no national police per se,16 U.N. policing units are comprised
of state and local police.1 In states which have a national police, such as
the French Gendarmerie, U.N. policing units are comprised of members of
the national police entity. 1 8 When deployed to a U.N. mission, national
contingents of police are under the nominal control of the designated
chief police official for the particular U.N. mission, although ultimately
these police officers must act in accordance with the demands of their
sending states and the established rules for the U.N. mission. 19 U.N.
police share a similar limitation on power with peacekeepers in that,
except in instances where the UNSC specifically permits it or where the
U.N. police are acting as the sole policing entity for the area
administered, they are unable to use force to prevent or deter crime.20
B. U.N. Police Missions
1. 1960s
West New Guinea was the site of one of the U.N.'s first peacekeeping
operations when, in 1962, the UNSC authorized the creation of the
United Nations Security Force (UNSF) in West New Guinea. 2' The goal
of this mission was almost exclusively policing, with the UNSF working
to supplement the local police and to assist the United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in its administration of the
area until the planned transfer of the area from Dutch control to the
Indonesian government.2 2 This mission was concluded in April 1963

14. See United Nations Police, http://www.un.org/Deptsldpkolpolicelindex.shtml
(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
15. See United Nations Police Deployment, http://www.un.org/Deptsldpkolpolicel
map.pdf(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
16. In the author's view, the National Guard does not meet the description of a
national policing entity because it is a military entity which can, in times of crisis, fulfill

a civilian police function but is not trained in police tactics or investigatory abilities in
the same way as a member of the Beninese Gendarmerie.
17.

See Serafino. supra note 2. at 20.

18.
See ROBERT M. PERITO, WHERE IS THE LONE RANGER WHEN WE NEED HIM?
AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR A POSTCONFLICT STABILITY FORCE 37-46 (2004).

19. Id. at86.
20. See id.
21.
See United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea Mandate, http://www.
un. org/Depts dpko dpko/co mission/unsfmandate.html (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
22. See id.
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when the contemplated transfer of power and control occurred." UNSF
is especially important to the author because it demonstrates that, at the
height of the Cold War and the inception of U.N. peacekeeping as a
usable concept, the U.N. police were authorized to and did stand in the
stead of local police forces and administer the policing component of an
area in its entirety.
One of the best known of the early U.N. peacekeeping missions was
the U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC), created in 1960 to stop the
24
disintegration of the Congo after it gained independence.
From a
policing standpoint, ONUC was also unusual and notable in that its
police forces were comprised solely of units from one nation.25
In 1964, the UNSC created the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) to assist in the implementation of a ceasefire between the
Greek 26
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, each of whom laid claim to the
island.
UNFICYP is still in existence today and is the oldest U.N.
peacekeeping mission to consistently use a policing element in its
operations. 2 ' Although the U.N. has been present on Cyprus for over
forty years, it has been and is a perpetual target of violence and attacks
from all sides in the ongoing hostilities, and U.N. police are often used
to protect the mission from such attacks.28 In addition, members of
UNFICYP have frequently found their movements and observer capabilities
restricted by both sides in the conflict. 29 There have also been sustained
problems with the U.N.'s ability to police the borders of the buffer zone,
which it created to stop incursions into the designated territories assigned to
each group. 30 Although the U.N. extended UNFICYP at the end of
2007, this extension came with the admission that UNFICYP was unable
to fully perform its policing and other functions. 3'

23.

See id.; United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea Facts and Figures,

http://ww.un.org/Deptsldpkoldpko/co missionlunsffacts.html (last visited Sept. 19,

2008).
24.
25.

26.

PERITO,

supra note 18. at 83; Serafino, supra note 2, at 44.

See id.

S.C. Res. 186, U.N. Doc. S/RES/186 (Mar. 24, 1964).

27. See United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, http://www.un.org/Deptsl
dpko/missions/unficyp/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
28. See S.C. Res. 1758, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1758 (Jun. 15, 2007); S.C. Res. 1178,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1178 (Jun. 29. 1998).
29. See generally id.

30.

Id.

31.

See S.C. Res. 1758, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1758 (Jun. 15, 2007).
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2. 1980s
With an impending election in the newly independent state of Namibia
looming, the UNSC created the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
in 1989 and tasked its troops and police officers with monitoring the
situation in Namibia leading up to and during these elections.32 Given
the limited nature of UNTAG's mandate, it was terminated in 1990 after
the completion of the elections.3 3
3. 1990s
In 1991, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
was created by the UNSC with a mandate to "monitor[] the human rights
situation...; investigat[e] ... human rights violations; promot[e] human
34
rights...; [and make] recommendations for the elimination of violations."
Later, ONUSAL's mandate was extended to include verification of
ceasefire enforcement and monitoring throughout the area 3' as well as
36
election monitoring during the 1994 elections.
Among the greatest
accomplishments credited to ONUSAL and its police force was having
"phased out" the old Salvadorian police force and having trained freshly
recruited police officers to create a new force.37
Also in 1991, the UNSC created the U.N. Mission for the Referendum
in Western Sahara (MINURSO).3 8 MINURSO was initially created to
assist in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the land claims issue
which plagued the Western Sahara region.39 Throughout their deployment,
the U.N. police in MINURSO have performed three functions: providing
security to tribal and U.N. officials, assisting in identification issues, and
assisting in the issue of refugee repatriation.40 In 2003, MINURSO

32.
S.C. Res. 632, U.N. Doc. S/RES/632 (Feb. 16, 1989).
33. See United Nations Transition Assistance Group, http://www.un.org/Deptsl
dpkoldpko/co mission/untag.htm (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
34. United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, http://www.un.org/Depts/

dpko/dpko/co missionlonusalbackgr2.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
35.
S.C. Res. 729, U.N. Doc. S/RES/729 (Jan. 14, 1992).
36. S.C. Res. 832, U.N. Doc. S/RES/832 (May 27, 1993).
37. See United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador, http://www tin.org/Deptsl
dpko/dpko/co mission/onusalbackgr2.html(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
38.
S.C. Res. 690, U.N. Doc. S/RES/690 (Apr. 29, 1991).
39. See id.
40. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
Concerning Western Sahara. delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/817
(Oct. 16, 2006); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation
Concerning Western Sahara. delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/35
(Jan. 15, 1998).

HARRINGTON
HARRINGTON

[VOL. 10: 155, 2008]

1 82009 426 O6PM
1/S/2009 4:26-06 PM

PolicingAgainst the State
SAN DIEGO INT'

LL.J.

significantly drew down its policing component.4' Currently, a small
contingent exists at MINURSO to provide security to visiting family
members of the U.N. peacekeepers.
The U.N. maintained a peacekeeping presence in Angola from 1988
onwards, although no police were a part of this mission until 1991, when
the former mission, the U.N. Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM
i), was phased out. 43 UNAVEM II, created in 1991, was tasked with
overseeing the withdrawal verification process and monitoring the
national police for the duration of the ceasefire.44 Unfortunately, the
presence of UNAVEM II did not stop the violence in Angola.45 This
increased violence resulted in a revised UNAVEM I mandate in 1993,
including the maintenance of the peace process and keeping the security
situation in Angola under effective control as mission tasks.46 In 1995,
UNAVEM I was terminated in favor of the UNAVEM II, which
continued the attempt to assist in ceasefire implementation until 1997. 47
During this time, the U.N. police were again tasked with maintaining
4
security despite the continued violence and unrest in Angola.
Specifically, the police deployed to UNAVEM III were asked to "verify
and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the disarming
of civilians, the quartering of the rapid reaction police and security
arrangements for UNITA49 leaders. 5 ° Finally, the UNSC replaced
UNAVEM III with the U.N. Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) in

41. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
Concerning Western Sahara, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1016
(Oct. 16, 2003).
42. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
Concerning Western Sahara, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/817

(Oct. 16, 2006).
43.

See United Nations Angola Verification Mission I Facts and Figures, http:/www.

un. org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1UnavemlF.html (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
44. S.C. Res. 696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/696 (May 30, 1991).
45. See S.C. Res. 834, U.N. Doc. S/RES/834 (Jun. 1. 1993); S.C. Res. 811. U.N.
Doc. S/RES/8 11 (Mar. 12, 1993); S.C. Res. 804, U.N. Doc. S/RES/804 (Jan. 29, 1993).
46. See id.
47. See United Nations Angola Verification Mission 1I Mandate, http://www.un.

org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemllM.htm(last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
48. See United Nations Angola Verification Mission III Profile, http:llwww.
un. org1Depts dpko dpko co missionlunavemp.htm (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
49. UNITA is the acronym for the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de
Angola, the rebel group which persistently fought the Angolan government during this
period.
50. See United Nations Angola Verification Mission III Profile. http://Www.un.orgl
Deptsldpkoldpkolco missionlunavemnj.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
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1997. 51 MONUA's mandate contained an expansive list of police
functions, including those previously required of U.N. police and an
additional focus on the administration of Angolan prisons. 52 During the
time of MONUA's deployment, the violence in Angola escalated and
hostilities were rekindled between the warring parties.53 MONUA's
mandate ended after two U.N. aircraft were shot down by unidentified
Angolan combatants.54
The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
was the second of three U.N. missions deployed to Cambodia during the
1990s and the first to include a policing component.55 Initially, UNTAC
was created to oversee the free election process envisioned by the Paris
56
Agreements of 1991 and to assist the Cambodians in demining activities.
Additionally, the U.N. police component was tasked to, among other
things, "supervise the activities of the administrative structures, including
the police.,, 57 The U.N. police went on to supervise civilian and other
police in Cambodia, develop codes of conduct for the Cambodian police,
and assist in border patrolling. 58 UNTAC ended in 1993. 59
The UNSC created the United Nations Mission of Observers in
Tajikistan (UNMOT) with the initial mandate of monitoring a ceasefire
and assisting in the implementation of a human rights regime in
Tajikistan. 60 Three years later, and amid continuing hostilities in Tajikistan,
the UNSC expanded the mandate of UNMOT to include the general
61
recreation of civil society and governmental function in the area.
While UNMOT only saw the introduction of two police officers to the
mission, these officers were instrumental in attempts to mold civil
society and the government of Tajikistan. 2 Ultimately, UNMOT was
terminated in 2000.63
51.
S.C. Res. 1118, U.N.Doc. S/RES/ 118 (Jun. 30, 1997).
52. See United Nations Observer Mission in Angola Mandate. http://www.un.
org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monuam.htn(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).

53.

See United Nations Observer Mission in Angola Background, http://www.un.

org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monuab.htm(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
54. See id.
55. S.C. Res. 745, U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (Feb. 28, 1992).

56. Id.
57. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Background, http://www.
un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co mission/untacbackgrl.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. S.C. Res. 968, U.N. Doc. S/RES/968 (Dec. 16, 1994).
61.
S.C. Res. 1138, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 138 (Nov. 14. 1997).
62. See id.; United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan Facts and Figures,
http://ww.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missionslunmot/UnmotF.html
(last visited Sept. 19.

2008).
63. See United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, http://www.un.orgl
Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/Unmot.htn(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
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In 1992, the UNSC created the U.N. Operation in Mozambique
(ONUMOZ) to monitor a ceasefire agreement.6 This operation included a
maximum of over one thousand police officers.65 These police officers
were tasked with functions, such as disarmament and demobilization
monitoring, "monitor[ing] and verify[ing] the disabling of private and
irregular armed groups," U.N. personnel and property protection, and
66
61
coordinating human rights protections. ONUMOZ ended in 1994.
The first U.N. peacekeeping and policing mission to Haiti was created
in 1993. 6 8 Referred to as the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), this
mission lasted until 1996 and was tasked with creating new Haitian
police forces, modernizing Haiti's armed forces, and monitoring the
provisions of the 1993 ceasefire between the warring factions in Haiti.69
In 1994, the UNSC expanded UNMIH's authorized mission to include:
"sustaining the secure and stable environment established during the
multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key
installations," and "the professionalization of the Haitian armed forces
and the creation of a separate police force."70 The UNSC ended UNMIH
in June 1996 and created U.N. Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) in
July 1996 to perform essentially the same functions as UNMIH. 71 This
mission lasted for a year and was replaced by the U.N. Transition
Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), which lasted for four months and was
tasked with the same functions as UNMIH and UNSMIH.7 2 When
UNTMIH was allowed to expire in 1997, the UNSC then authorized the
73
creation of the U.N. Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH).

64. S.C. Res. 797, U.N. Doc. S/RES/797 (Dec. 16, 1992).
65. United Nations Operation in Mozambique Facts & Figures, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/co mission/onumozF.html (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
66. United Nations Operation in Mozambique Mandate, http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/dpko/co mission/onumozM.htm (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
67. See United Nations Operation in Mozambique Summary & Background,
http:/www. un.org/Depts dpko dpko/co mission/onumozS.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
68. See S.C. Res. 867, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sept. 23, 1993).
69. See id.
70. S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (Jul. 31, 1994).
71.
S.C. Res. 1063, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1063 (Jun. 28. 1996); S.C. Res. 1048, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1048 (Feb. 26, 1996).
72. See United Nations Support Mission in Haiti Mandate. http://www.un.orgl
Depts/dpkodpkoco mission/unsmihmandate.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008); United

Nations Transition Mission in Haiti. http://Www.un.orgDeptsldpkoldpkolco mission/
untnih.htn (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).

73.

See United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, http://www.un.org/Depts

/dpko/dpko/co mission/miponuh.htn (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
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MIPONUH was given the same mandate as its predecessors, with a
special emphasis placed on supervisory training for civilian police by
U.N. police, the training of special police units within the constructed
Haitian civil police body, and "guiding police agents in their day-to-day
duties. 74 After three years, MIPONUH was unable to carry out this
mandate fully and ceded control of policing tasks to the International
Civil Support Mission in Haiti, which
75 was not under the auspices of the
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping.
In 1992, the UNSC created its first peacekeeping mission in Somalia
(UNOSOM 1).76 This force was ultimately insufficient to meet the needs
of the situation in Somalia and, in 1993, the UNSC discontinued
77
UNOSOM I in favor of UNOSOM II.
UNOSOM II's first mandate
involved the prevention of violence resumption, disarmament supervision,
the protection of international personnel and assisting the refugees
created by the Somalia conflict. 78 In 1994, the UNSC created a new
79
mandate for UNOSOM II.
Regarding U.N. policing in the UNOSOM
II mission, this mandate included "[a]ssisting in the reorganization of the
Somali police and justice system," overseeing repatriation projects,
"assisting the political process in Somalia," and the protection of
international personnel.80 Despite these tasks and the presence of U.N.
troops, the U.N. withdrew UNOSOM II in 1995 because of heavy
mission casualties and a lack of progress in the peace process. 81
The UNSC created the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
in 1993. 82 Initially, the primary police concerns were monitoring ceasefire
implementation and subsequent disarmament and destabilization attempts,
83
assisting in the security of selected cities and human rights assistance.
However, during 1994 the situation in Rwanda became worse and the
UNAMIR staff generally was tasked with the job of acting as
intermediaries in the conflict.8 4 It was during this time that genocidal
acts occurred within U.N. monitored areas without the intervention of
U.N. police or peacekeepers. 85 In the wake of the events of 1994, the
74. Id.
75. See id.
76.
77.
78.
79.

S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr. 24, 1992).
S.C. Res. 814, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993).
See id.
S.C. Res. 897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/897 (Feb. 4, 1994).

80.

Id.

81.
See United Nations Operation in Somalia II Summary & Background,
http://ww.un.org/Deptsldpkoldpko/co mission/unosom2backgrlhtml (last visited Sept.

19, 2008).
82.
83.

S.C. Res. 872, U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (Oct. 5, 1993).
See id.

84.

See

85.

See id.

HAUSSLER,

supra note 2, at § 3.3.1.
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UNSC added a specific police component description to UNAMIR's
mandate. 86 In 1996, the UNSC terminated UNAMIR's mandate. 87
Also in 1993, the UNSC created the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG), with the mandate of ceasefire monitoring." UNOMIG
continues to function as a U.N. peacekeeping mission with police
presence today. 89 Interestingly, the U.N. shares jurisdiction over the
contested area of Georgia with peacekeepers from the former Russian
states (collectively, the Commonwealth of Independent States or "CIS"),
which have exerted more effective control over the region throughout
UNOMIG's history. 90 The primary policing function ascribed to UNOMIG
initially was to assist in law enforcement training at the mission. 9 1 At
the same time that the U.N. zone was the subject of many criminal acts,
other areas of Georgia which had been affected by the conflict were
maintaining their own, separate local police forces.92 Notably, a
hostage-taking incident involving U.N. personnel occurred in 2003, ten
years after UNOMIG's deployment to the region. 93 Later in 2003, the
UNSC adopted a resolution mandating more robust policing for
UNOMIG. 94 However, the rebels effectively blocked the deployment of

86. S.C. Res. 997, U.N. Doc. S/RES/997 (Jun. 9, 1995).
87. See United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda Mandate, http:/www.
un. org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co mission/unamirM.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
88.
S.C. Res. 858, U.N. Doc. S/RES/858 (Aug. 24, 1993).

89. United Nations Observe Mission in Georgia Facts & Figures, http://www.
un. org/Deptsldpko/missions/unomig/facts.html (last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
90. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the
Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia,delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/529
(May 3, 1994) (discussing the general relationship between the U.N. and CIS contingents).
For a thorough understanding of the relationship between the U.N. and CIS contingents
during the course of UNOMIG, see generally the Reports of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Docs. S/1994/529 S/2007/588, available at http://www.un.org/Deptsldpkolmissions/unomig/
unomigDrp.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
91. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/751 (Jul. 21,
2003).
92. See The Secretary-General, Reports of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC.
S/1997/340-S/2007/588, available at http://ww.un.org/Deptsldpkolmissionslunomig/
unomigDrp.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
93. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/751 (Jul. 21,

2003).
94. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1019 (Oct. 17,
2003).
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any further U.N. police. 95 Additionally, the UNOMIG police force was
unable to provide the required local police training because of local and
96
rebel resistance to the idea.
These issues have continued unabated
97
from 2003 to the present.
In 1995, the U.N. created the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) as the successor mission to the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR). 98 From the outset, it was intended that
this mission include a police function and presence. 99 Due to the failures
of the UNPROFOR mission in stopping the hostilities and violence on
the ground, UNMIBH's functions themselves were ambiguous and allowed
the Secretary General a large amount of leeway for the governance and
function of the mission.10 However, these functions soon grew to
include the creation of a new police force for Bosnia, one which was
intended to be a "European" police force rather than a police force
staffed with and constructed on the ideals of the local population.101
UNMIBH ended in 2002.102
Sierra Leone has seen several U.N. peacekeeping missions over the
past decade. The first, the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNOMSIL), lasted a little over a year and was terminated after 10its3
peacekeeping troops were forced to evacuate under threat of attack.
Originally, UNOMSIL's mandate required that its members, including
police:

95. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, delivered to the Security Council. U.N. Doc S/2004/26 (Jan. 14.
2004). As a side note, it can be argued that allowing a rebel group which claims the right

to control over a certain territory the ability to block U.N. or other actions specifically
agreed to by the host state erodes the sovereignty of the host state because it implies that
the host state is not able to control the affairs occurring within its borders. This, in turn.
can be seen as legitimizing the rebel group as well.
96. See, e.g., The Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on the
Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/32
(Jan. 17. 2005).
97. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia, delivered to the Security Council. S/2007/588 (Oct. 3, 2007): The
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary- General on the Situation in Abkhazia,

Georgia, delivered to the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/2003/751 (Jul. 21. 2003).
98. S.C. Res. 1035, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (Dec. 21, 1995).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See Dilshika Jayamaha. United Nations Civilian Police: Towards a Framework
For Effective Assessments of International Peacekeeping Operations at 80 (Feb 2007)
(unpublished M.A. thesis. John Jay College of Criminal Justice of the City University of
New York) (on file with author).
102. See United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Mandate. http:/www.
un org/Depts/dpkomissions/unmibh/mandate.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).

103.

See U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone Background, http://www.un.orgl

Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/UnomsilB.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
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[A]dvise.. .the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police

practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to

respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies, to
advise on the planning of the reform and restructuring of the Sierra Leone
police force and to monitor progress in that regard;
[ .... R]eport on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in
Sierra Leone, and, in consultation with the relevant United Nations agencies, to
assist the government
104 of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's
human rights needs.

After UNOMSIL disintegrated, the UNSC created the U.N. Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) with additional forces to attempt a greater and
more robust international presence in Sierra Leone.'0 5 Ultimately, UNAMSIL
was unsuccessful in its efforts and was replaced by the U.N. Integrated
Office for Sierra Leone, a non-peacekeeping office established by the
UNSC in 2005.' °6 Initially, UNAMSIL was tasked with, in relevant part,
assisting with the disarmament and implementation of the applicable
ceasefire, ensuring the safety of U.N. personnel, offering election support,
and support to the parties. '°7 By 2000, the U.N. policing component of
UNAMSIL was tasked to . . . coordinate with and assist... the Sierra
Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities,"
and provide security to "strategic locations" in Sierra Leone. 0 8 In 2001,
the UNSC found that it had to reiterate the goals of UNAMSIL, many of
which were based in its policing arm. 0 9 Specifically, the UNSC stated:
[T]he main objectives of UNAMSIL ... remain[] to assist the efforts of the
Government of Sierra Leone to extend State authority, restore law and order and
further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to

assist in the promotion of the political process, leading to a renewed disarmament.
demobilization and reintegration program[] where possible .... 110

The Central African Republic was the sight of a U.N. peacekeeping
mission in 1998 entitled U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic

104. S.C. Res. 1181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1181 (Jul. 13, 1998).
105. S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).
106. See United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Background, http://www.un.orgl
Depts/dpkomissions/unamsil/backgroundhtml(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
107. S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (Oct. 22, 1999).
108. S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1289 (Feb. 7. 2000).
109. S.C. Res. 1346, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1346 (Mar. 30, 2001).
110. U.N. Security Council, Report of the Security Council to the General
Assembly, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/56/2 (Sept. 19, 2001).
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MINURCA entailed many police functions, key among

To assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom
of movement...:
To assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in
protecting key installations...;
To supervise, control storage, and monitor the final disposition of all weapons
retrieved in the course of the disarmament exercise;
To ensure security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and
the safety and security of United Nations property
To assist in coordination with other international efforts in a short-term police
trainees program and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police,
and to m1rovide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special
forces.

MINURCA continued until 2000, after key elections were held in the
Central African Republic.' '"
In 1999, the UNSC authorized the creation of the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)." 4 The UNSC
resolution vested UNTAET with the "responsibility for the administration
of East Timor, [was] empowered to exercise all legislative and executive
authority, including the administration of justice."'" Police, as well as
peacekeepers, were vested with authority to essentially recreate East
Timorese civil society with little guidance other than the general
116
requirements of the UNSC resolutions and the rules of engagement.
UNTAET ended in 2002 when the UNSC did not extend its mandate in
favor of the creation of UNMISET, discussed below." 7
In 1999, the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo SMONUC) became the second U.N. peacekeeping mission to
the Congo. 8 MONUC is still in existence, controversially, 1 9 eight
111.
S.C. Res. 1159, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 159 (Mar. 27. 1998).
112. Id.
113. See United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic Background,
http://www tin.
org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/minurcaB.
htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
114.
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, http://www.un.
org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
118.
S.C. Res. 1291, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1291 (Feb. 24, 2000). The previous mission
was the United Nations Operation inthe Congo (ONUC).See United Nations Operation
in the Congo, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missionslonuc.htm(last visited Sept. 19,
2008).
119. In 2005, MONUC was the first
U.N. mission to be plagued by persistent and
verifiable allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers this issue continues to harass
MONUC and the U.N. generally. See Alexandra R. Harrington, Victims of Peace:
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years after its creation. 12 As with many peacekeeping missions, MONUC
was created with the original intent of monitoring and assisting in the
implementation of a ceasefire. 12 1 Despite its military and police
component, the UNSC faulted MONUC for its inability to protect the
local population from violence in 2001.22 After nearly being discontinued,
MONUC was extended with enhanced policing requirements to assess
the capabilities and training levels of the national and local Congolese
police. 123 At various times, the MONUC police were required to act as
bodyguards to certain elected Congolese officials and to coordinate the
124
framework for police with the Congolese Minister of the Interior.
Throughout the policing component of MONUC, there is a pervasive
sense of understanding that the local and national Congolese police are
the problem and that MONUC police must fix this problem as part of
their mission. 125
In its most daring departure from the text of the U.N. Charter and
principles of respect of sovereignty, in 1999, the UNSC established the
U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 126 UNMIK functions today as it
was intended-to be a transition government in Kosovo pending the
outcome of the issue of Kosovar independence. 12 ' Although Kosovo
officially declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008-and
has been accepted as a legitimate state by the United States and most of

Current Abuse Allegations Against U.N. Peacekeepers and the Role of Law in
Preventing Them in the Future, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125 (2005).

120.

See United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, http://www.un.org/Deptsldpkolmissionslmonucl(lastvisited Sept. 19, 2008).
121. S.C. Res. 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30. 1999).
122. See S.C. Res. 1341, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1341 (Feb. 22, 2001).

123.

S.C. Res. 1445, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1445 (Dec. 4. 2002).

126.

U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, About the United Nations

124. The Secretary-General, Third Special Report of the Secretary-Generalon the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/650 (Aug. 16, 2004); The
Secretary-General, Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/251 (Mar. 25. 2004).
125. See The Secretary-General, Special Report of the Secretary-General on
Elections in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. delivered to the Security Council. U.N.
Doc. S/2005/320 (May 26, 2005).
Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (2007), http://ww.unmikonline orglintro.htm
(last visited Sept. 19. 2008).
127. See id.
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Europe-UNMIK still functions as a governmental body in Kosovo. 28
Currently, UNMIK officials and EU officials are negotiating the drawing
down of UNMIK's presence and operations in Kosovo. 12 9 For the
purposes of this article, UNMIK's nine years of history relative to
policing activities in Kosovo will be discussed. In terms of U.N.
policing, UNMIK's police operation serves as the Kosovar police and
fulfills every function of a standard municipal or national police forcedepending upon the nation-as well as investigations of allegations
against individuals from the Kosovo conflict. 130 The police element of
UNMIK, like the other administrative elements of UNMIK, is overseen
by a U.N. representative as set forth in the constitution of Kosovo, which
was drafted by the U.N. shortly after the cessation of hostilities.13 1
4. 2000 present
In 2002, the UNSC created the United Nations Mission of Support in
East Timor (UNMISET) to oversee the implementation of peace in the
newly independent state of East Timor. 132 Although these goals were
supportive at the time UNMISET was created, the unrest in East Timor
continued unabated by the presence of U.N. peacekeepers and police,
resulting in the UNSC's 2003 decision to increase the amount of police
authorized for the mission and the policing mission per se. 133 Despite
the presence of an ever-increasing number of U.N. police, the Secretary
General's reports to the UNSC reflect a relatively unchanged level of
crime. 134 The Secretary General's reports to the UNSC regarding
UNMISET are illustrative in that they chart the growing involvement of
the U.N. police force with local policing in East Timor, setting the stage
for the complete takeover of East Timorese police operations by the
U.N. policing force by a different U.N. peacekeeping mission. 13 By late
2003, the Secretary General reported that the U.N. police were actively
128. See U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Recent Events Make it
More Challenging for U.N. to Administer Kosovo-envoy (Jul. 25, 2008), http://www.
unmikonline.org/news.htm#1508 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
129. See id
130. See United Nations Police, http://www.un.org/Deptsldpkolpolicelindex.shtml
(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).

131.

See About the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo.

http://www.unmikonline.orglintro.htn (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
132.
S.C. Res. 1410, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002).
133.
S.C. Res. 1473, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1473 (Apr. 4, 2003).
134. See The Secretary-General. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/117 (Feb. 13. 2004); The Secretary-General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, delivered to the
Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/2002/1223 (Nov. 6, 2002).
135. See sources cited supra note 135.
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involved in providing legal as well as policing research to the East
Timorese.136 Throughout the Secretary General's reports on UNMISET
it is clear that, while the situation involving crime and its punishment
had not changed drastically since the deployment of UNMISET policing
forces, it was the goal of the Secretary General to portray the situation as
needing further U.N. intervention.'13
In 2003, the UNSC created the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to
assist in the supervision of an attempted ceasefire between the parties.138
The initial UNSC authorizing mandate was reformed slightly to
specifically provide for "1,115 civilian police officers, including formed
units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout
Liberia."' 139 Practically, this authorization was used to allow the U.N.
police to restructure police and social services in Liberia, including "[a]ll
the institutions in the criminal justice sphere."' 140 These tasks came to
include the restructuring of the Liberian national police in the way
determined by the U.N. police unit and screening for all new recruits to
the national police. 141Throughout 2005, the situation in Liberia became
more violent and the U.N. police were asked to assist peacekeepers in
quelling incidents of rebellion. 142 The U.N. claimed that these incidents
were a demonstration of the weakness of the new national police force
and used this claim to substantiate the need for continued U.N. police

136. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Mission of Support in East Timor, delivered to the Security Council. U.N. Doc.

S/2003/944 (Oct. 6, 2003).
137. See The Secretary-General. Special Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, delivered to the Security Council,

S/2004/117 (Feb. 13, 2004); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon
the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor, delivered to the Security Council,

U.N. Doc. S/2002/1223 (Nov. 6, 2002).
138. S.C. Res. 1497, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1497 (Aug. 1, 2003).
139. S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19. 2003).
140. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security
Council on Liberia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/875 (Sept. 11,

2003).
141. The Secretary-General. FirstProgress Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Liberia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2003/1175 (Dec. 15. 2003).
142. See The Secretary-General, Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/560 (Sept. 1, 2005).
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monitoring of and involvement in the national police apparatus. 143 By
2007, violence continued to be a problem in Liberia, with the U.N.
stating it had been unable to physically place members of the new
national police in communities and areas where necessary. 144
In 2004, the U.N. Operation in Burundi (ONUB) was created; it was
maintained by the UNSC until 2006.145 The UNSC authorized ONUB
members to do everything from disarmament to institutional rebuilding.
The U.N. police had the requirement "to carry out institutional reforms
as well as the constitution of the integrated national defence [sic] and
internal security forces and, in particular, the training and monitoring of
the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms. '1 46 In 2006, the UNSC allowed ONUB's
mandate to expire in favor of the newly
created U.N. Integrated Office in
1 47
Burundi, a non-peacekeeping entity.
Also in 2004, the UNSC created the U.N. Operation in Cote D'Ivoire
(UNOCI) with the goal of facilitating the implementation of a 2003
ceasefire between the warring parties. 148 Among UNOCI's tasks were
the "provision of technical assistance for the reform and restructuring 1of
49
[police] institutions," as well as training of the Ivorian police forces.
Despite the wishes of the Ivorian Gendarmerie, U.N. police worked their
way into the functioning of the Ivorian National Police School,
Operation Center for Prefecture of Police, Judicial Police, Traffic Unit,
and International Airport police.150 The presence and involvement of the
U.N. police did not, however, increase the safety of the Cote D'Ivoire.151
The U.N. police role became heavily centered on providing security to
143. The Secretary-General. Tenth ProgressReport of the Secretary-Generalon the
United Nations Mission in Liberia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.

S/2006/159 (Mar. 14. 2006).
144. The Secretary-General, Fifteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-Generalon
the United Nations Mission in Liberia, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2007/479 (Aug. 8, 2007).

145.

S.C. Res. 1545, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004).

146.

Id.

147.

See United Nations Operation in Burundi. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/

missions/onub (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
148.
S.C. Res. 1528, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004).
149. The Secretary-General, First Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Operation in C6te d'lvoire, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.

S/2004/443 (Jun. 2, 2004).
150. The Secretary-General. Third ProgressReport of the Secretary-Generalon the
United Nations Operation in C6te d 'Ivoire, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.

S/2004/962 (Dec. 9, 2004).
151.
See The Secretary-General, Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General
on the United Nations Operation in C6te d'lvoire. delivered to the Security Council.
U.N. Doc. S/2005/186 (Mar. 18, 2005); The Secretary-General, First Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in C6te d'lvoire, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/443 (Jun. 2, 2004).
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U.N. personnel,
as well as some "monitoring and mentoring" of the local
52
police.1

As mentioned above, the U.N. returned to Haiti in 2004 when the
UNSC created the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
which is currently an active mission involving U.N. police as well as
peacekeepers. 153 The MINUSTAH mandate made it clear that U.N.
police were to play a central role in this mission, tasking them with:
a)... support[ing] of the Transitional Goverment. to ensure a secure and a
stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti
can take place;
b)... assist[ing] the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and
reforming the Haitian National Police, consistent with democratic policing standards,
including through the vetting and certification of its personnel, advising on its
reorganization and training, including gender training, as well as monitoring/
mentoring members of the Haitian National Police;
d) ... assist[ing] with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law,
public safety and public order in Haiti through the provision inter alia of
operational support to the Haitian National Police and the Haitian Coast Guard,
as well as with their institutional strengthening, including the re-establishment
of the corrections system;
e) ... protect[ing] United Nations personnel. facilities, installations and equipment
and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, taking
into account the primary responsibility of the Transitional Government in that
regard;
f) ... protect[ing] civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within
its capabilities and areas of deployment, without prejudice154to the responsibilities
of the Transitional Government and of police authorities.

Despite these goals, the U.N. has been the target of consistent and
sustained violence in the wake of MINUSTAH's deployment and the
police have been tasked with assisting in the safety of U.N. personnel.15 5
MINUSTAH police have also been involved in reforming the Haitian
152. See The Secretary-General, Fourteenth Progress Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Operation in Cdte dIvoire. delivered to the Security

Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/593 (Oct. 1, 2007); The Secretary-General, Seventh Progress
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cdte d'lvoire,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/2 (Dec. 9, 2004).

153. S.C. Res. 1541, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1541 (Apr. 29, 2004); S.C. Res. 1529. U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004).
154. S.C. Res. 1542, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004).
155. See, e.g., The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti, delivered to the Security Council. U.N.

Doc. S/2005/313 (May 13, 2005).
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police and policing system. 156 Throughout 2006, the language of the
Secretary General's reports indicated that the Secretary General believed
the Haitian police to be operationally and infrastructurally inadequate
and these reports frequently noted that the U.N. police component of
MINUSTAH was
insufficient to allow it to more fully operate the
157
Haitian police.
In 2005, the UNSC created the U.N. Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)
to provide support to a ceasefire agreement between the Sudanese
government and one of the rebel groups operating in the Sudan.158 From
its inception, UNMIS was intended to involve itself in the policing and
rule of law mechanisms used in the Sudan. 159 One of the first Secretary
General reports on UNMIS stated the opinion that the Sudanese police
were inadequate; this was used as the fundamental principle guiding
UNSC resolutions and SG authorizations for the UNMIS operational
standards.1 60 Interestingly, despite this condemnation, the police deployed
to UNMIS were first tasked not with curbing the high crime rate in the
areas of the Sudan to which they were deployed but rather with training
the Sudanese police in policing methods.1 After a year, the Secretary
General's report indicated the goal of U.N. police in UNMIS was to
reform both the national and local police in the Sudan "along "international
democratic standards. 162 In 2007, the Secretary General's reports
increasingly called for UNMIS police to become involved in community
protection, the protection of U.N. personnel, escort duties for displaced
persons and others, and "confidence-building patrols. ' 163 Later in 2007,
the U.N. police took credit for intervening to release seventy-five
''persons unlawfully held in local police and prison custody," although
the reasons surrounding the illegality of the Sudanese holding these
156. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti, delivered to the Security Council. U.N. Doc.
S/2005/631 (Oct. 6, 2005).
157. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/592 (July 28. 2006); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti,delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 2, 2006).
158. See S.C. Res. 1590, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005).
159. Id.
160. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/787 (Oct. 4, 2004).
161.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/57 (Jan. 31, 2005).
162. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon Darfur, delivered
to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/591 (Jul. 28, 2006). The Secretary-General
did not define "international democratic standards" of policing or police reform.
163. The Secretary-General, Monthly report of the Secretary-General on Darfur,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/104 (Feb. 23, 2007).
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prisoners and the laws under which their incarceration was illegal (i.e.,
164
international law, Sudanese law, or local law) were not discussed.
According to the UNSC's authorization for the newly created African

Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), it is intended
65
that many of UNMIS' policing functions be resumed under UNAMID.
However, to date the U.N. has been unsuccessful
in convincing its
66
member states to send forces to UNAMID.1
In 2006, the UNSC created the U.N. Integrated Mission in TimorLeste (UNMIT), its fourth peacekeeping mission to the East Timor
region.
This mission was created with the express goal of bringing
stability to the region and is still ongoing today. 168 In terms of policing,
UNMIT appropriated prior missions' involvement in Timorese police
training and monitoring and also began to train the Timorese police in a
criminal procedure code as well as an internal disciplinary code. 169 It is
essential to remember that these codes were not created by the Timorese
per se, but were a compilation of views as to what the respective codes
and practices should be. As the situation in Timor-Leste continued to be
violent and the government manifested an inability to control the
violence and its causes, the U.N. stepped up the involvement of UNMIT
police in the overall Timorese policing situation.' 0 Currently, the U.N.
and the Timorese government have agreed that the U.N. police should
act as the police force for Timor-Leste until further notice.'
This
includes screening potential recruits for an anticipated Timorese national

164. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/500 (Aug. 20. 2007).
165. See S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (Jul. 31, 2007).
166. See U.N. Admits Darfur Troop Shortfall, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilafrica/7622337.stn(last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
167. See United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, http://www.un.orgl
Depts/dpko/nmissions/unmit/index.html(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
168.
S.C. Res. 1704, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1704 (Aug. 25. 2006).
169. See id. See also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on
Justice and Reconciliation in Timor-Leste, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2006/580 (Jul. 26, 2006); The Secretary-General, End of Mandate Report of the
Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste. delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/251 (Apr. 20, 2006).
170.
S.C. Res. 1745, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1745 (Feb. 22, 2007).
171.
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations IntegratedMission in Timor-Leste (for the periodfrom 27 Januaryto 20 August
2007), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/513 (Aug. 28, 2007).
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police force, thus giving UNMIT the ability
to control the future
17 2
composition and mentality of Timorese police.
The UNSC authorized the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad (MINURCAT) in September 2007 in response to concerns that
refugees and unrest from the Darfur region in the Sudan could act as a
destabilizing effect on the Central African Republic and Chad. 173 Many
tasks have been assigned to the up to 300 authorized U.N. police officers
who will be part of MINURCAT. 174 It is important to note that Chad's
original request for a peacekeeping-like force was to protect the
Sudanese refugee areas only; instead, the UNSC initially mandated that
some of the Chadian police force be appropriated by the U.N. police to
act as seconds for them.1 75 These officers would have been hand-picked
by U.N. police, trained by the U.N., kept separate from their counterparts in
the standard Chadian police force, and made to wear U.N. uniforms
although technically not part of the U.N. policing apparatus.1 76 After
receiving complaints regarding this idea, the UNSC changed its policing
mandate slightly to emphasize that the selected members of the Chadian
police would retain their status as solely allied with Chad and would not
wear U.N. uniforms; the rest of the plan has been maintained.1 77 The
UNSC has stated that it wants the Chadian police to create a special
refugee force, which the U.N. would train.1 78 The UNSC has also adopted a
plan to create "zones" within Chad in which international police and
Chadian police trained by them would operate. 79 Although the mandate
for the Central African Republic portion of MINURCAT's policing
operations is less explicit, the UNSC has stated that, overall, it intends
for MINURCAT to provide support to U.N. troops and train the local
troops in each nation affected."i0

172.
173.
174.

See id.
S.C. Res. 1778, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 25. 2007).
See id.

175. See The Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the
Central African Republic, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/1019
(Dec. 22, 2006).
176. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the
Central African Republic, delivered to the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/2007/97 (Feb.
20, 2007).
177. See The Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the
Central African Republic, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/488
(Aug. 10, 2007).
178. See id.
179. See id.

180.

S.C. Res. 1778, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1778 (Sept. 25, 2007).
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH U.N. POLICING

A. Composition
Except for ONUC, all U.N. policing missions involve police officers
from a variety of sending states. In a sense, this can be argued to be
good because it does not place the burden on a particular national police
force or municipal force. However, a further evaluation results in
serious questions as to the wisdom of this practice practically and in
terms of maintaining sovereignty. Even among police from different
parts of the US, there exists a disparity of understanding of protocols,
traditional practices, and norms such as human rights law value and
adherence.181 Considering the sending states for U.N. policing operations
typically represent states with differing stages of development, socioreligious norms, economic norms and exposure, legal constructs and
methods of legal enforcement, expectations of police and relationships
between the police and the state, views on what constitutes a fundamental
human right, the value of human rights generally, and the importance
and role of human rights law in policing, it is perhaps
not surprising that
18 2
problems in U.N. police missions can and do exist.
It must be remembered that many members of U.N. police units are
from countries which are relatively new or which have experienced
conflict involving the police in the recent past and are still not fully
recovered.183 This leads to a situation where police units are uncertain
what their functions are domestically and this uncertainty transfers with
them when they go abroad on U.N. missions. This uncertainty can also
lead to a lax sense of proper conduct and consequences for bad behavior
because each contingent will logically have a different legal and societal
understanding of proper police conduct and the ramifications of improper

conduct. 184
181. See PERITO, supra note 18, at 86.
182. See PERITO, supra note 18, at 86. Perito, however, seems to limit the
differences in background between U.N. policing members as an initial hurdle to be
gotten over. Id. The author believes that background issues are more than an initial
hurdle and are rather a monument to the lack of legal cohesion and planning used for
U.N. policing activities.
183. For a breakdown of complete donor statistics for U.N. missions from 1994
until present, see Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police
Personnel, http://Www.un.org/Deptsldpkoldpkolcontributorsl(lastvisited Sept. 19, 2008).
184. See Alexandra R. Harrington, ProstitutingPeace: Correlations Between the
Laws of U.N. Peacekeeping Mission Sending States and Bad Acts Committed by
Peacekeepers While Stationed at U.T Missions and Their Repercussions forthcoming in
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Also, many police forces provided by sending states have themselves
been or are the subject of massive human rights law violation accusations
and proven claims.185 Perhaps this is no more persuasively shown than
in the way that U.N. police units have handled the allegations of
sexual abuse which have been leveled against them, as well as their
peacekeeping counterparts. As with peacekeeping, there is a direct
correlation between the socio-legal sending state background of a U.N.
police officer and (1) the likelihood that he will commit an act of abuse
while on a mission; and (2) the likelihood that he will suffer serious
1 86
consequences at home as well as on the mission if such an allegation.
Additionally, it must constantly be borne in mind that the U.N. legal and
operational structure is such that all troop and police contributions to
U.N. missions are voluntary and, thus, it is difficult for the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping to control the identity of sending states due
to its constant need for police and troops to staff an ever-increasing
number of authorized and extended missions.187 Additionally, the established
legal structure surrounding peacekeepers and police officers on U.N.
missions mandates that, beyond reprimand and dismissal from a U.N.
mission, the U.N. cannot discipline a police officer or peacekeeper as they are
solely under the jurisdiction of the sending state. 88 This rule also makes
peacekeepers and police immune to the jurisdiction of the recipient state
in the event allegations of wrongdoing are made. 189
Thus, the question becomes whether the legal constructs created for
U.N. policing actually work to create a unit that is as comprehensive in
the basic tenets necessary to carry out its mission as it is in its
understanding of the mission itself. This open question is a threat to the
the Florida State University College of Law Journal of Transnational Law and Policy
(2008).
185. For example, the Bangladeshi police force along with its military has been
the subject of a massive human rights abuse debacle. See generally Special Report:
Lawless Law-Enforcement & the Parody of Judiciary in Bangladesh. 5(4) ARTICLE 2 OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2006), available at

http: www. article2.org/pdf/v05n04.pdf(last visited Sept. 19. 2008).

186.

See Harrington, supra note 182.

187.

See PERITO, supra note 18, at 90: Serafino, supra note 2. at 5. It is the author's

contention this system is in need of reform and it is irresponsible of the U.N. not to have
a more appropriate legal framework for the evaluation of sending states' eligibility prior
to deployment.
188. See OLA ENGDAHL, PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL IN PEACE OPERATIONS: THE
ROLE OF THE

SAFETY CONVENTION

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF GENERAL

INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 55 (2007) (discussing the use of Status-of-Force Agreements
(SOFAs) to protect U.N. peacekeeping mission personnel).

189.

See id.; Franqoise J. Hampson & Ai Kihara-Hunt. The Accountability of

PersonnelAssociated With PeacekeepingOperations, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning & Ramesh Thakur eds.
2007).
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sovereignty of the recipient state because it allows a collective policing
unit to operate within its territorial borders using a variety of legal and
non-legal norms and constructs to inform its behavior with the guarantee
of immunity from prosecution in the recipient state for conduct which is
inappropriate under the laws and standards of the recipient state or the
U.N. Perhaps obviously, this situation undermines the sovereignty of
the recipient state and its laws, and creates a situation in which the
recipient state cannot legally protect its citizens from the outside police
forces deployed within its borders and with its permission.
B. Function and Mission Fluctuation
As demonstrated in the descriptions of the various U.N. policing
missions over time, it is highly probable that a U.N. policing operation
will be required to perform a variety of functions-often not
contemplated at the time the operation was created-over the life of the
mission. Although this could be argued as a sign of mission flexibility,
the author believes these fluctuations in mission expectation and
function are dangerous to the mission and, more importantly, to the
civilians the U.N. police are tasked with protecting. Mission mandates
from the UNSC are extremely broad, perhaps justifiably, and primary
guidance for U.N. police operations comes from the Secretary General's
office and the U.N. commanders on the ground at the mission. 90 When
these actors have differing understandings of U.N. police intent
throughout a mission, a situation is created in which those deployed as
U.N. police officers are faced with changing tasks, often in situations
where a threat to the mission and its members causes them to become
guards for the mission.1 91 This is problematic and destabilizing to the
mission, and the inherent understanding of the officers as to their
functions at home and abroad, because it leads to a lack of mission
knowledge for the police who are tasked with carrying out many
important elements of the U.N. mission. Also, in situations where the

190.

See Head of Department of United Nations Department of Peacekeeping

Operations, http://www.un.org/DeptsldpkoldpkolinfolpageI.htm (last visited Sept. 19,

2008). All U.N. missions have selected commanders who serve as the head of the
mission and its military and policing components. See Current Operations of United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. http://www.un.org/Deptsldpkoldpkol
(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).

191.

See supra Part III (describing the many instances in which U.N. police were

required to provide security for U.N. peacekeeping mission personnel).

1 82009 426 O6PM
1/S/2009 4:26-06 PM

HARRINGTON
HARRINGTON

U.N. has required its police to conduct investigations into allegations of
wrongdoing and to attempt to train local police, the knowledge of an
imminent retasking could result in a lesser performance.192 Thus,
instead of uniting for a well-defined and understood goal during the
period of deployment, U.N. police face the knowledge that, if mandates
or directives change, so do their roles and concentrations. This undermines
the sovereignty of the recipient state by weakening the overall stability
and reliability of policing exercises entered into by the local police
forces and U.N. police.
C. TrainingIssues
The U.N. itself admits there is a serious, and potentially missionthreatening, disparity in the police training required of sending states
prior to the deployment of police to U.N. missions. 93 In what was
touted as a major doctrinal call for the reform of the U.N., the "Brahimi
Report" trumpeted the need for police training reform by sending states
when issued in 2000.194 However, years after its issuance, the Brahimi
Report and its supporters have yet to implement legal and structural
reforms which would create a baseline of police training necessary for
all members of U.N. police missions prior to their deployment. 195 Given
the increase in U.N. policing missions generally and the UNSC's
conscious decision to co-opt police functions in several states, lack of
training parity is a vital problem area. This problem poses a particular
threat to the stability-and hence ability to retain effective sovereign
control-of the recipient state which has transferred its police force and
the training thereof to U.N. control because differences between the
instructors and their training yields disparities in the lessons taught and
attitudes imparted to new police recruits.
D. Keeping up Appearances
U.N. peacekeeping is a function of the UNSC's mandates and the
contributions of sending states. This causes many issues in terms of

192.

See supra Part III(discussing the role of U.N. police in restructuring local

police forces and the different roles required of U.N. police during the course of their
deployment).
193. See PERITO, supra note 18, at 93-94; Serafino, supra note 2, at 8, 17-18.
194. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, delivered to
the Security Council and GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21,
2000), available at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace operations/docs/a 55 305.pdf
(This report was spearheaded by Lakhdar Brahimi from Algeria and is commonly

referred to as the Brahimi Report).
195. See Serafino, supra note 2, at 8.
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peacekeeping and policing, not the least of which is the need for U.N.
peacekeeping operations to have a positive appearance for the benefit of
the organization, sending states, and the concept of peacekeeping and
policing in the U.N. context. This has led, and continues to lead, to
situations in which peacekeeping-policing missions underperform or are
afflicted with serious problems, yet these situations and problems
96 go
unreported or underreported to maintain the image of the mission.1
This is more than a dirty little secret or even a dereliction of the legal
duties assumed by the U.N. when it sends a peacekeeping mission anywhere
in the world. It is also a threat to the sovereignty of the recipient state
because it gives the recipient state a false understanding of the situation
occurring within its borders. Particularly when the maintenance of a
ceasefire is at issue, this false understanding can prove deadly when the
parties have incorrect knowledge of the effectiveness of the ceasefire,
the ability of their own forces to maintain control of certain areas, and
the time within which outside forces can be expected to leave. The
author' believes this is one of the primary reasons for the high rate of
recidivism among nations which receive U.N. peacekeeping missions.
E. Setting
There are two key issues relating to U.N. police and the setting to
which they are deployed, one institutional and one based in the population.
Institutionally, the proclivity of the U.N. and the international community
not to define whether a state has "failed" to avoid admitting that a state
has actually dissolved or ceased to exist leads to a lack of understanding
on the part of the police. 197 Is this state completely lawless? Are there
local laws to enforce and are we the ones to enforce them? Are we
creating a police force in the old state framework or in a new framework
which is being developed? These are sample questions which easily
arise in a situation where UNSC mandates are extremely vague, the
Secretary General has control over operational details and tends to parrot
the UNSC, and answers are not self-evident from the situation.
In terms of population, there is an inherent question of identity. Who
are the U.N. police? What do they intend to do? What can they do?

196.
197.

See Jayamaha, supra note 101.

WILLIAM LEWIS & EDWARD MARKS, Police Power in Peace Operations, in
CIVILIAN POLICE AND MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING: A WORKSHOP SERIES 4 6 (Apr.

1999).
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Who do they represent? Some argue that this uncertainty as to identity
is particularly strong when U.N. police are sent in to fill a void left by
departing U.N. peacekeepers.1 98 While this might indeed be true, the
author believes that, in the chaos of conflict and given the U.N.'s dismal
track record of establishing effective communications with the local
population generally, this identity issue permeates all U.N. policing
missions, especially those such as Kosovo, where the U.N. is currently
carrying out all essential state functions. Whereas some authors posit
that the civilian populations in areas of U.N. intervention dislike police
because they think the police are covering for the future departure of
peacekeepers,1 99 the author argues that the civilian populations are more
concerned with what the U.N. police will mean to them, their power
structures, and safety.
As a result, the sovereignty of the recipient state is undermined
because the local population typically does not understand who the U.N.
police are and what they represent. This leads to the idea that the
recipient state's government cannot police its territory and thus the state
has ceded its power over its territory and people to some external forces
who are both foreign and unknown. This phenomenon is further
exacerbated by the presence of U.N. police officers who are uncertain of
their role in the community and the political realities of the state to
which they have been deployed.
V. SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS

The practical problems with U.N. policing forces discussed above
illustrate the many issues involved in the U.N.'s halting attempt to create
a place for police in the U.N. peacekeeping apparatus and to develop that
place based on global politics rather than a settled legal framework.
This Section will discuss a more theoretical, yet highly relevant, problem
associated with U.N. policing: its role on sovereignty.
At its heart, the legal concept of sovereignty has always revolved
around the effective control of an area and its population by a ruling
group, be it a monarch or an elected government. In this setting,
effective control correlated, and still correlates, to the ability to provide
for the population governed. Modern societies have used many methods

to exercise control over their populations, key among them the use of a
local or national police force to enforce the laws of the sovereign and, as
applicable, the community. For good or ill, police are methods of defining
society as well as controlling it.
198.
199.

Id.at 9.
Id. at 15.
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In repressive regimes, police were and are associated with an unjust
government, instilling terror in the population and, more often than not,
inspiring the policed to work against them. Thus, police become the
method through which a community defines itself in repressive regimes
in that they are the thing to be fought against and not emulated. They
undermine the community in that they seek to tear it apart to build a
passive community to do the bidding of the government. In democratic
countries there are, admittedly, instances of police brutality and action
which is harmful to society. However, by and large the police are a
trusted portion of the community. If there is a robbery, one phones the
police and expects that they will assist in the prompt and appropriate
investigation of the incident. Community policing in democratic regimes
seeks to make police officers well known to the community in a good
way and more easily accessible than simply keeping police in their
barracks to wait for trouble to come to them. Thus, in democratic
societies the police are part of the community's self-definition. This is
evident even in situations of police misconduct because the community
generally regards such actions as abhorrent and such allegations bring
the community together to define who they are, and more importantly,
are not, and the laws which are of societal importance to them. U.N.
policing lacks these norms because it is not reflective of national
sovereignty for the reasons set out below.
A. Who's Law Are They Enforcing?
Perhaps it is redundant to reiterate that police cannot exist without
law. Be it within a tribe or in a metropolis, those who act as peace
enforcers must enforce something regardless whether it is called a tribal
dictate or a law. This is no different in the context of U.N. policingoutside of protecting U.N. staff members, there must be some law for
these police officers to enforce or else they are essentially useless.
Understanding the law being applied in U.N. police operations is not as
easy as one might assume.
Perhaps the most glaring incidents of uncertainty over the law to be
applied by U.N. police are in situations such as Kosovo and East Timor,
where U.N. police have been transformed into the local and national
police force. In Kosovo, the law applied by U.N. police for the past
eight years has been the law promulgated by the U.N. body which is
"administering" Kosovo. In East Timor, final details are still being
worked out, however it is clear that the U.N. police are to use an
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"international" standard of criminality in their functions as the police
force for Timor; this is bolstered by the UNSC tasking the U.N. police
with assisting in the recreation of the rule of law, including law itself, in
East Timor. Nominally, U.N. police are working to promote the safety
of citizens in these areas; in reality, they are working to introduce the
legal norms of a foreign body, composed of disparate legal understandings
itself, in a state which has its own legal culture and tradition. While it is
true that laws in these areas were perverted to justify police and societal
brutality during the times of strife which occasioned U.N. intervention, it
is not true that such intervention was meant to be the death knell of law
as the state and its community understood and accepted it.
Beyond Kosovo and East Timor, many U.N. police officers are
required to participate in disarmament and demobilization campaigns in
post-ceasefire settings. This function is less controversial in the legal
sense until one gets to the actual issues involved in this process. It is
increasingly true that signatories to ceasefires might not represent the
entire spectrum of combatants involved. For example, in Northern Ireland,
a ceasefire has been in effect for years and rival groups sit in Parliament
together yet one of the holdout Ulster Unionist groups only announced
its decision to disarm in November 2007 although disarmament has been
a legal requirement since the time of the ceasefire. 200 Northern Ireland is
unique in that the situation always existed inside a well established and
essentially non-fluctuating legal construct which was able to act as a
governor on the violence and its aftermath because of laws which were
accepted by a majority of the communities at issue. 2° 1 However, in
conflict situations such as the ones in which U.N. police are involved,
there is typically less legal and structural cohesion and thus it is more
difficult to bind factions of a group to a ceasefire with which they might
not agree. The issue of the law being policed becomes a question of
more than just the terms of the ceasefire.
Additionally, regardless of the location, the Secretary General's reports
are replete with instances of U.N. police observing mass violations of
ceasefire terms, from crossing borders to amassing weapons, by sides
which were legitimately signatories to the ceasefire.20 2 It can therefore
logically be argued that the U.N. police are attempting to enforce the law
of a ceasefire which neither side respects or thinks it should abide by. In
this situation, there is a question as to the legal legitimacy of the
200. See UFF Given the Order to Stand Down, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12. 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk-newslnorthern ireland/7089310.stm (last visited Sept. 19,

2008).
201. Despite the periods of civil unrest in Northern Ireland, there was never a time
when the area was thrown into lawlessness.
202.

See supra Part I1I.
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ceasefire, its terms, and, thus, whether the U.N. police should be tasked
with monitoring and implementing these terms.
Over time, most U.N. police missions have involved some component
of training local police and assisting in the recreation of the rule of order
in the area to which they are deployed. Training will be discussed
further below but it should be pointed out that these forces are trained in
human rights law and international concepts of law and order-whatever
these might actually be given the disparate concepts of policing among
the international community and even the five permanent members of
the UNSC. While this might indeed be beneficial to the local community,
there is a vast question as to whether these laws are actually binding on
the states and police being trained. It must also be mentioned that many
of the police units tasked with providing training in human rights law are
themselves known and proven violators of such law, which calls into
question the propriety of using these police units to train others in
concepts which they have not yet mastered themselves.
Assisting in the recreation of the rule of law is, on its surface,
innocuous because the police are an important part of any legal system.
However, in the U.N. context, the question of an outside force attempting to
recreate a rule of law system for a sovereign state directly impacts on the
state's sovereignty because it implies that the state and its police force
are unable to exercise an essential legislative or governmental function
without international guidance. This raises the additional questions of
whether the laws developed through this exercise will reflect the legal
standards of the state and whether these laws will be seen as legitimate
and upheld over time.
B. Whose' CulturalStandards Are Being Applied?
In New York City, jaywalking is treated as a legal offense.2 °3 Drive
for a few hours north of New York City and jaywalking, while of
questionable legality, is de rigueur. This anecdote demonstrates the
differences in cultural standards and attitudes towards conduct which is
illegal and whether it merits punishment within as few as one hundred
fifty miles. Culture is an inherent part of law and, subsequently, the
maintenance of law and order.

203. See David Rohde, Officer Apprehends a Perpetrator. The Charge Is
Jaywalking,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at B 1.
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The laws applied by U.N. police and the laws under which they
operate within a mission and recipient state do not necessarily resonate
with the populations they are tasked with protecting. Also, the cultural
understanding of their powers and purpose within a society hampers
U.N. police. It is startling to note the frequency with which violence on
the ground either remains high or increases once U.N. forces, and
especially U.N. police, have been deployed. Coupled with the number
of violent acts committed against or attempted against U.N. police
officers and peacekeepers, it is evident that, by local cultural standards,
the U.N. mission and its members are regarded as an impotent force,
incapable of protecting themselves or those under their protection. Fair
or not, cultural understandings of U.N. police are equally dismal and run
the gamut from outside repressors to agents of a disliked and brutal state
to child molesters.
With such cultural disdain and lack of understanding by all parties,
U.N. police threaten the strength of the host state's sovereignty because
they make the host state look weak and in need of help, or tyrannical.
This does not help to strengthen the power of the host state or the
legitimacy of the laws which U.N. police are tasked with helping to
create. This also casts doubt on the acceptance of U.N. trained and
vetted police forces within the communities they are tasked with
policing, thus undermining the police and the policed.
C. What Sovereign Are They Working to Promote?
At its most disturbing to an international law and trading system
premised on state sovereignty is the image of UNMIK, which effectively
is the seat of Kosovar sovereignty to the extent that it exists. Within this
model, the U.N. police deployed to Kosovo work to promote the concept
of Kosovar "sovereignty" created through the fiction of UNMIK and a
portion of the international community."' A step down from this are the
U.N. policing operations which seek to create law and protocol for,
among other things, the local and national police force and to train future
members of these forces. In both of these situations, a unit of
multinational police officers was asked to use an "international"
concept of policing to establish rules for police and to select and then

indoctrinate new recruits. Selection included "vetting," although the
precise requirements of this term is unclear, and a concerted effort to
break the police force recruits away from their old laws, culture, and
204. 1 say part of the international community because Russia voted to authorize
UNMIK but will not recognize a Kosovar state separate from Serbia. See Final Kosovo
Talks End in Failure, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/21hileuropel
7116606.stm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
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customs in favor of an unidentifiable sense of internationalism. Granted,
many police forces were complicit in acts of unspeakable brutality and
even genocide; this does not mean that an entire overhaul of the local
and national police forces on an international scale is warranted or
respectful of state sovereignty. Nor does it make an outside force comprised
largely of those with different legal, cultural, religious, and societal
beliefs-many of whom have not met the human rights and rule of law
requirements mandated by the international community themselves-the
appropriate body to recreate a police force for those who are attempting
to solve their own national demons and move forward as a community at
law and spirit.
Given the legal steps that the international community has and
continues to take to avoid a state effectively disintegrating within the
international system, this method of police recruitment and training
seems to stand for the proposition that it is more important to maintain a
state along the lines acceptable to the international community than to
the will of those actually living in the state.
D. Does Sovereignty CorruptionStop at the Mission's Door?
Assuming that U.N. policing inherently violates the principle of state
sovereignty which has been given primacy in international law because
it corrupts and attempts to change the very concepts of law and order
which define a community, is that the only damage done? Unfortunately,
there have been very few studies conducted on the impact of participation in
a U.N. policing mission on returned police officers. In the world of
theory, however, it can be extrapolated that participation in a U.N. police
mission would destabilize many police forces.
International policing inherently requires a police officer to look
outside the standards and norms to which he is accustomed. It requires
him to be more of a combatant than is usual in most domestic policing
situations. It requires, in many instances, the police officer be involved
in training new recruits in international law norms which are not used or
strictly adhered to in the sending state of the police officer. It causes
him to come in contact with police officers from systems which are
fundamentally different from his and which challenges his concept of the
police and the state which creates them. Assuming that the police in any
state are the ultimate expression of the socio-legal beliefs of the state and
its community, such exposures are not the equivalent of a pleasant cultural
exchange. Instead, these interactions can be agents of corruption for the
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system in which the police officer usually functions and to which he
returns. Since this system is a reflection of the state, the experiences of a
U.N. police officer on a mission can undermine the sovereignty of
his sending state because they infuse an international character and
understanding into a system which is an inherently domestic reflection
of accepted mores and legal beliefs.
E. If Not U.N. Policing Then What?
U.N. policing has been shown to be a pervasive practice on U.N.
missions. Increasingly, the UNSC has required U.N. police to act in
capacities outside of the advisory realm, creating situations which
diminish the sovereignty of the recipient and sending state. This is due
in large part to the legal framework through which the concept of U.N.
policing was created and has been allowed to operate since the 1960s.
Accepting the central thesis of this article-that the U.N. policing
apparatus is corrosive to the sovereignties of the recipient and sending
states and thus an illegitimate use of U.N. authority in an international
law system premised on state sovereignty-how else can local populations
and U.N. missions be protected in times of strife?
The first answer 205 would be to increase the power of the military
troops sent on peacekeeping missions to allow them to use force when
necessary to protect themselves and the local population. This would do
away with the need for an auxiliary U.N. police force to assist
peacekeepers in their day to day functions and security, and would foster
the creation, maintenance, or both of the local police force out of
necessity.
The second answer would be to adopt the police training style used by
206
the American government.
This system provides everything from
rudimentary to advanced police training to police forces in conflict and
post-conflict situations yet does not carry with it the same sense of
ownership of the local police force itself. Certainly, it is an established
fact that police forces are on the front line of political repression and

205.

This answer is premised on accepting U.N. peacekeeping itself as a valid use

of the U.N. charter and non-corrosive to state sovereignty. The author does not
necessarily accept either of these positions as true; however, this answer is raised
because it can be accomplished within the extant peacekeeping framework. For a further
discussion of the perils ofU.N. peacekeeping regarding state sovereignty, see Alexandra
R. Harrington, A Tale Of Three Nations? The Role of United Nations Peacekeepers and
Missions on the Concept of Nation-State, Nationalism, and Ownership of the State in
Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Kosovo, 21 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 213
(2006).

206. Serafino. supra note 2. at 5 (describing several types of bilateral policing
assistance offered by the US to a variety of countries).
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violations of human rights in many conflict situations. However,
procedures exist to find and try those members of the police forces who
were complicit in such acts. As has been shown through the recidivism
rates for U.N. missions involving policing and the duration of other
missions involving policing, even attempting to hand pick new members
of a police force does not correlate to changing the mentality of the
police force itself or the community which it polices. Hands-off training
provides the forces trained with vital information and tools to become a
functioning police force and has been successful in training these police
forces. In reality, this is all any outside entity can hope to do for a
particular population or group because the local police must operate
within the legal and society constructs created for them by law and community
standards; imposing an artificial construct such as "international
policing," which is not tied to any particular laws and which has no basis
in the community, does not help the recipient state or its citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION

Police movies and the use of U.N. policing on peacekeeping missions
might seem an unusual pairing. However, the goal of this article has
been to demonstrate that the lessons of classic police movies translate to
domestic and international police operations. There is a different relationship
between the police and the policed domestically than there could ever be
internationally because the inherent elements of the police and policed
relationship are a shared sense of law, a shared sense of community
and moral values reflected in the law, and a shared understanding for the
procedural framework for the law. Even in the most oppressive of regimes,
aspects of these elements are shared. It is when these elements are not
shared and parity is not attempted that policing changes its tenor and the
police go from agents of the sovereignty, which is represented by the
police force, to agents of an outside power.
The U.N. police are the outside police force and yet they have been
increasingly called on to act in the stead of the local police. Regardless
of the reasons advanced for this usurpation it is exactly that, a usurpation
of state sovereignty through the exercise of outside control over the
state's people and territory. Although the international system might
favor maintaining states within the system, there can be no denying the
legal and society affects of U.N. policing on the sovereignty of the recipient
state. Additionally, the sovereignty of the sending state is compromised
because deployment on U.N. police missions results in exposure to concepts
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and events which differ from the legal and societal expectations of the
sending state.
Ideally, foreign police would never be deployed to conflict areas because
there would be no need. Practically, this article has demonstrated that
there are ways to train local police forces in conflict prone states without
usurping or corroding sovereignty. And that is perhaps better than the
conclusion of any police movie.

